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To restrict predatory 
lending in 
the subprime 
(high cost) mortgage market, Congress 
enacted in 1994 the Home Ownership 
and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA). 
This law restricts some types of lend-
ing and requires lenders to disclose 
additional information about loans 
that have predatory features. Follow-
ing the lead of federal regulations, at 
least 23 states, beginning with North 
Carolina in 1999, have introduced their 
own predatory lending laws, using 
HOEPA as a template.' 
Perhaps not surprisingly, research 
focusing on the impact of the North 
Carolina law found that the rate of 
applications and originations for 
subprime loans declined after the law 
took effect. We extend prior research, 
which focused on the North Carolina 
law, and find large variations in mar-
ket responses to the state predatory 
lending laws. These results suggest 
that a closer look at the design of the 
laws is needed. If market responses 
are contingent on how a law is writ-
ten, then policy-makers may be able 
to craft predatory lending laws to 
either stimulate or depress the sub-
prime market. 
Beyond HOEPA 
HOEPA is designed in two phases. 
First, loans are covered by HOEPA 
if they meet the law's definition of 
high-cost loans. Second, for covered 
loans, certain product types and lend-
ing practices are restricted. The state 
predatory lending laws, although styled 
after HOEPA in terms of the coverage 
and restrictions approach, have aimed 
to go beyond the federal law. 
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In terms of coverage, the state 
laws are typically designed to cover 
a broader segment of the mortgage 
market. Loans covered under HOEPA 
include closed-end home equity loans 
(refinance and second mortgages only) 
that have an annual percentage rate 
(APR) and/or finance points and fees 
exceeding a certain threshold. TIle 
state laws typically extend the cover-
age of HOEPA by including both 
closed-end and open-end mortgages 
(lines of credit, refinance and for-pur-
chase mortgages), as well as lowering 
the APR and/or fee trigger.' However, 
the extent of coverage increase varies 
among laws, ranging from almost 
no extension beyond HOEPA (for 
example, the Florida law) to almost 
full market coverage (for example, the 
Colorado law, which applies to loans 
of almost all purposes and types). 
For covered loans, each law identi-
fies cUfferent types of restrictions. 
Typically, state predatory lending laws 
strengthen restrictions beyond those 
required by HOEPA. These restric-
tions usually include additional limits 
on allowable prepayment penalties 
and balloon payments, prohibitions 
of joint financing of various insur-
ance products with the mortgage, and 
requirements that borrowers partici-
pate in loan counseling.3 Again, there 
is substantial variation among the state 
laws in tern.s of expanding the law's 
restrictions. For example, Maine and 
Nevada largely leave HOEPA restric-
tions intact, while Georgia is much 
more restrictive of balloon payments 
and prepayment penalties.' 
Impacts of laws on Row of Credit 
Predatory lending laws are in large 
part designed to restrict the availability 
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of high-cost crecUt because of evidence, 
although anecdotal, of abusive prac-
tices associated with certain product 
types. Therefore, holcting evelything 
else constant, we should anticipate a 
reduction in originations of subprime 
loans after a law is implemented. This 
reduction could come from more appli-
cants being rejected or fewer house-
holds applying for subprime loans. 
A series of studies has used tables 
of mortgage conditions before and 
after the North Carolina law took 
effect and compares these meh'ics with 
growth rates in nearby states and the 
nation as a whole. Using the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 
data set, economists at the Center for 
Responsible Lending in North Caro-
lina concluded that the volume of loan 
originations declined in North Caro-
lina relative to the rest of the country.' 
However, a group of economists at 
the Center for Community Capitalism 
(University of North Carolina at Cha-
pel Hill) used a different data set and 
found no volume impact on purchases 
or low credit score loans, but a decline 
in the volume of refinanced loans." 
Other studies have used regression 
analysis to identify the impact of the 
laws in North Carolina, Chicago and 
Philadelphia.7 (Since publication, the 
Philadelphia law is no longer in effect.) 
All of the studies found evidence that 
the introduction of the North Carolina 
law substantially reduced the flow of 
subprirne credit. The impact seems to 
be larger for low-income borrowers 
and minority borrowers. Also, the 
volume reduction was largely attrib-
uted to lower application rates rather 
than to increased rejection rates. The 
lower application rates could result from 
potential applicants being deterred by 
the tightened lending standards 
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under the new law or from lenders 
increasing pre-screening to comply with 
the law's restrictions. 
Going Beyond North Carolina 
Using a treatment-control framework, 
we examine the impacts in a variety of 
locations to see if the North Carolina 
experience was representative of other 
states. For the treatment group, we sam-
ple only border counties in the state with a 
predatory lending law. The control group 
includes border counties in neighbor-
ing states that do not have a law in effect 
during the examined time period (the year 
before and the year after the introduc-
tion of the law). This sample design and 
Hlv1DA availability reduce the sample to 
10 state predatory lending laws.s 
Following previous research, for each 
law sample (treatment and control loans), 
we estimate the probability of three sepa-
rate outcomes: applying for a subprime 
loan, originating a subprime loan and 
being rejected on a subprime application. 
In our sample, which spans from 1999 
to 2003, approximately 20 percent of the 
applications were for a subprime loan, 
while only 10 percent of loans Originated 
were subprime. In addition, over 40 
percent of the subprime applications were 
rejected. We control for various location 
and borrower characteristics using prox-
ies, such as county unemployment rate, 
population growth, and borrower income 
and minority status. On most of these 
dimensions, subprime applications were 
very similar to prime applications. How-
ever, subprime applications on average are 
associated with lower borrower income 
and are more likely to come from locations 
with more minority households. 
The table reports the impact of each law 
for each of the three measures on the flow 
of credit (application, origination and rejec-
tion): The impact represents the change 
in predicted probability of the outcomes 
as the laws become effective. Consistent 
with the literature, the results indicate that 
the North Carolina law did reduce the 
flow of subprime credit through a reduc-
tion in both application and origination 
probabilities. However, the experience in 
North Carolina is replicated in only one-
half of the laws examined. In the other 
half, the introduction of the law was found 
to increase the flow of subprime credit, as 
measured by application or origination. 
Further examination of the design of 
the laws sheds some light on these incon-
sistent results. Each state's predatory lend-
ing law extends HOEPA in a different way. 
Some laws have broader market coverage, 
while others are more restrictive of certain 
lending practices; broad coverage does not 
necessarily translate into more restrictions, 
and vice versa. Most of the laws that were 
found to reduce the flow of credit, like the 
North Carolina, Georgia and Massachu-
setts laws, tend to have stronger restric-
tions, which could reduce the availability 
of loan types and lead to lower application 
and origination rates. On the other hand, 
laws that are associated with an increase 
in the flow of credit, like the ones in 
California and Maryland, tend to cover a 
larger segment of the subprime mortgage 
market. One way to interpret these results 
is that if borrowers view better cover-
age as a sign of better protection against 
predatory lending, then they will be more 
confident and, hence, more likely to apply 
for subprime loans. 
Because state predatory lending laws 
are not created equal, future research 
should test in a more complete model 
whether coverage encourages more appli-
cations in the subprime market and the 
extent that these additional applications 
may be able to counteract any reductions 
in the flow of credit due to stronger lend-
ing restrictions. 
Anthony Pennington-Cross is a senior economist, and 
Giang Ho is a research associate, both at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
Impacts of State Laws on the Flow of Credit 
Law Sample (treatment and control loans) Application Origination Rejection 
California 3.2 6.7 -25.8 
Connecticut 1.4 2.3 1.3* 
Florida - 3.0 0.8 -5.7 
Georgia -5.6 -D.7 -11.0 
Massachusetts - 7.4 -3.2 -3.0 
Maryland 2.9 1.8 -6.6 
North Carolina -6.9 -4.2 -4.8 
Ohio -D.5* -D.4* -2.2 
Pennsylvania 3.7 3.2 3.2 
Texas 18.9 10.7 14.8 
The impact of a law is measured as the percentage point change in the share of subprime applications (first column), 
the percentage point change in the share of subprime originations (second column) and percentage point change in 
the share of subprime applications rejected (third column), In addition, * indicates that the estimated change could not 
be distinguished in terms of its statistical properties from zero-in other words, the law had no measurable impact. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 As of the end of 2004, the foll owing 
states had a predatory lending law in 
effect: Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, 
Kentuc~)', Maine, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Nevada, New jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, Texas, Utah and Wisconsin , 
2 A refinance mortgage replaces an existing 
mortgage with a new mortgage, whereas 
a for-purchase mortgage provides a 
new mortgage for buying a new home, 
Lines of credit typically do not have an 
amortization schedule and, therefore, are 
considered open-end credit. 
3 A prepayment penalty charges the 
borrower a fee if the loan is paid off 
early, A balloon payment is payment 
made at the end of the mortgage to 
cover any outstanding principal and 
is typically much larger than the prior 
monthly payments, A loan with a bal -
loon payroent is by definition not fully 
amortizing. 
• For a detailed description of the local 
laws, see Appendix A in Ho and Pen-
nington -Cross (2005), "The Impact of 
Local Predatory Lending Laws," Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working 
Paper, WP 2005-0498. Available at 
www.research.stlouisfed.org. 
s See Ernst, Farris and Stein (2002) 
6 See Quercia, Stegman and Davis (2003 
and 2004) 
7 See, for example, Harvey and Nigro 
(2003 and 2004) and Elliehausen and 
Staten (2004) 
8 California, Connecticut, Florida, 
Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania 
and Texas, 
9 Detailed results on other variables are 
available upon request. 
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